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ABSTRACT
This study uses the distribution free approach to investigate cost efficiency in a panel of
Greek banks over 1993-1999, a period characterized by major changes in the banking sector
brought about by gradual financial deregulation. These reforms were supposed to provide an
opportunity to Greek banks to improve their efficiency and to enhance their competitiveness
in view of ongoing financial integration in Europe and the introduction of the euro. The
results obtained indicate that important cost X-inefficiencies are in place. Some evidence is
provided that bank characteristics such as bank size, type of ownership and risk behaviour do
play a role in explaining differences in measured inefficiencies. Scale economies are also
examined and the findings indicate that the Greek banking industry experiences economies of
scale, though they have declined throughout the observed period. This suggests that
competitive viability may be an important factor for further consolidation in the Greek
banking industry.
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1. Introduction
During the last two decades, financial sectors have undergone profound
changes worldwide. Deregulation of financial systems and liberalisation of external
transactions, as well as the application of advanced information and communications
technologies have all intensified competition among institutions in local and
international financial markets and paved the way for the introduction of new
financial instruments and practices. Indeed, the way that banking is conducted was
gradually altered and the technology of bank production was significantly modified.
As a result, banking systems internationally have entered an era of restructuring and
reorientation of their activities. Similar developments were also observed in the Greek
banking system, as Greek banks had to adjust to the new conditions that resulted from
the gradual liberalisation of the domestic financial market and the completion of the
European internal market and, thus, to the increasingly competitive environment in
recent years. This trend is expected to continue as the number of non-bank
competitors increases and competition from foreign, and in particular from European
banks, picks up, mainly in response to the introduction of the common currency and
the initiatives taken by the European Commission in the context of the Financial
Services Action Plan to remove remaining obstacles to the European financial
integration, but also in response to the general globalization of markets.
In this regard, a frequently asked question is about the effect(s) of these
changes on Greek banks and, more precisely, how Greek banks will be affected by the
intensified competitive pressures. In other words, concerns raised about the long-run
competitive viability of various Greek banks in the new environment that has
gradually emerged. The answer to this question depends at least in part on how
efficiently they are run. Accordingly, the objective of this paper is to investigate the
efficiency of Greek banks and how it has developed in recent years. More specifically,
our aim is to shed light on the following: (1) whether all banks are cost efficient, that
is whether all banks operate on or close to the best practice cost frontier; (2) whether
larger banks enjoy a cost advantage over smaller competitors, that is, whether the
system is characterized by important economies of scale; and (3) whether factor
productivity has changed over time, that is, whether banks have benefited from
technical progress.6
Previous research in Greek banking provides some contradictory evidence on
scale economies. A study by Karafolas and Mantakas (1996), who used a sample of
11 Greek banks over the period 1980-89, did not find any significant total cost scale
economies, although operating cost economies of scale were estimated to be
statistically significant. Eichengreen and Gibson (2001) investigating the profitability
of 25 Greek banks over the period 1993-98 found evidence of a bell-shaped
relationship between profitability and bank size, implying that profitability initially
increases and then declines as bank size increases. More specifically, their results
indicate that when profitability is measured by the rate of return on assets, ROA, scale
economies are exhausted at around the average size of banks in their sample, which is
indeed very low by European standards. On the other hand, when profitability is
measured by the rate of return on equity, ROE, their estimates suggest that banks of
all sizes may reap scale economies. More recently, Athanasoglou and Brissimis
(2003), comparing operational costs across banks of different size, concluded that for
the period 1994-97 economies of scale are present in the case of small and medium
size banks, but diseconomies of scale exist for large banks, whereas for the period
2000-02 economies of scale were found for all banks. No study has yet been
published on the X-efficiency of Greek banks. It has been widely recognized that for a
group of banks of similar size that show greater dispersion of average costs (or
profits) than banks of different sizes, X-efficiency is a much more important source of
cost reduction (or profit increase) than achieving an optimum size of production to
minimize average costs (see Maudos et al 2002). Given the lack of such analysis and
taking into account the considerable merger activities among Greek banks during
recent years, answers to the above questions are clearly of interest.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes briefly the liberalisation
of Greek financial system and how this has affected banking structure and operations.
Section 3 provides an overview of the methodology used to investigate cost
efficiency. Section 4 presents the theoretical model and discusses data problems.
Section 5 discusses the main empirical findings and Section 6 concludes.7
2. Deregulation and restructuring of the financial system
Until the mid-1980s, the banking system in Greece was used as a means of
implementing economic policy and promoting, mainly, industrial development, by
applying a highly complicated system of selective credit controls and regulations
along with a wide range of administratively-determined bank interest rates. In
practice, however, that system proved to be ineffective and led gradually to allocative
inefficiencies and to serious distortions in the functioning of the financial system. The
creation of a modern, market-oriented system necessitated the liberalisation of interest
rates, the deregulation of the domestic market and the lifting of restrictions on
external transactions.
By the early 1990s, bank interest rates had been gradually liberalised and all
quantitative credit restrictions and investment requirements concerning the financing
of specific economic sectors, notably the public sector, had been phased-out.
Moreover, the central bank had authorised the introduction of new financial products,
such as leasing, factoring, forfaiting and venture capital, while specialised credit
institutions had been given permission to expand their activities to sectors formerly
open only to commercial banks and vice versa. At the same time, restrictions on
capital movements and current transactions were also gradually lifted. Thus banks
were increasingly able to grant loans on their own terms and differentiate their lending
rates based on liquidity and risk considerations only, as well as to choose the types of
activity on which they wished to focus, to expand their operations in preferred
segments of the market and use new techniques for hedging against interest rate and
foreign exchange risks.
Important measures were also taken to promote the operation of the capital
market and new institutions were introduced such as brokerage firms. Furthermore,
the operating framework of undertakings for collective investment in transferable
securities (UCITS) was improved and the supervisory role of the Capital Market
Committee was enhanced. As a result, the capital market gradually became an
important source of capital for the funding of enterprises as an alternative to bank
financing. It also became an important source of funds for the banks themselves,
especially in the late-1990s.
The environment that emerged gave impetus to the establishment and
operation of new banks, either domestic institutions or branches of foreign banks.8
Indeed, from the late-1980s to the late-1990s, ten commercial banks were
incorporated in Greece
1. In addition, since 1993 when the Bank of Greece set the
operational and supervisory framework concerning cooperative banks, fifteen
cooperative banks have been established and operate, although their market share
remains very low (less than one per cent of total assets of the banking system).
Regarding foreign banks, the picture is mixed. On the one hand, seven foreign banks
established branches in Greece from the late-1980s to the late-1990s. On the other
hand, some foreign banks, in the context of their broader strategies, have withdrawn
from the Greek market over the past few years.
Following financial deregulation and the enactment of new legislation
implementing EU directives, banks operating in Greece had to adjust to new
conditions and cope with the ensuing intensified competition, both domestically and
cross-border. Besides, the completion of the European internal market along with the
major advances in information technology and telecommunications, which have led to
the globalisation of the financial services market, necessitated the reorientation of
banks’ activities and resulted in a restructuring of the banking system. Another factor
putting pressure on banks was the increasing role of institutional investors, which
made it more difficult for the former to attract deposits and, consequently, induced
banks to search for alternative sources of funds and for ways of reducing their
operating costs.
Moreover, Greek banks pursued restructuring policies in order to become
more efficient and obtain a size that would enable them to increase or, at least,
maintain their domestic market shares, facilitate their access to international financial
markets and exploit any possible economies of scale. To this end, since the mid-1990s
several Greek banks have been involved in mergers and acquisitions. Most of them
concerned the domestic market, including not only banks but also non-bank financial
enterprises. Some large credit institutions opted to merge with their subsidiaries with a
view to restructuring their activities and cutting their operating expenses. Others have
forged strategic alliances with major European institutions in order to benefit from the
latters’ know-how, large branch network and presence in international financial
centres. Some Greek banks have also expanded their operations in countries to the
                                                          
1  Six more banks were incorporated in the early 2000s.9
wider area of south-eastern Europe, notably in the Balkans, either via subsidiaries or
through the establishment of branches.
  At the same time, Greek credit institutions have taken important steps towards
improving their efficiency by installing modern information technology systems,
cutting their operating costs and improving their organisational structure, while they
have extended their scope of business by offering new products and services. They
have merged their subsidiaries engaging in the same line of business and integrated
several of their activities in an effort to reduce costs and improve control and service
quality. Additionally, several banks have tried to expand or further develop their
activities in such sectors as bank assurance, where they can profit from synergies and
cross-selling by both bank networks and insurance companies.
   Another very important aspect on which Greek banks have focused their
attention is on the branch network and alternative distribution channels. Branches
offer the advantage of (physical) proximity to customers, especially in retail banking.
On the other hand, the maintenance of an extensive branch network entails high
operating costs, with negative implications for bank efficiency. Technological
advances have allowed banks to develop remote banking channels: ATMs, telephone
banking, online PC banking and Internet banking, the first two being the most
commonly used in the Greek market at present. During the 1990s, the number of bank
branches operating in Greece almost doubled, from 1,529 in 1990 to 3,004 in 2000,
mainly reflecting the relatively low level of branching in the past.
2 In the same period,
the number of ATMs exhibited a remarkable increase, from 326 in 1990 to 3,472 in
2000. In addition, new technologies changed the way in which bank branches are
organised, by favouring the operation of smaller branches with fewer but more highly
qualified staff, focused on a better promotion of bank products and meeting of
customers’ needs.
Mergers and acquisitions have resulted in higher concentration in the banking
industry: the market share of the top-5 banks as a percentage of total assets rose from
57% in 1995 to 65% in 2000. This, however, has not led to less competition, as
evidenced by the reduction in interest rate spreads, especially in the segments of
consumer and housing loans, in the past few years, which can only partly be attributed
                                                          
2 It is worth noting that in terms of inhabitants per branch the Greek credit system is still underbranched
as compared to other EU countries. This is not, however, the case when GDP per branch is taken into
account.10
to convergence to the rates prevailing in the eurozone. Accordingly, this indicates
that, if anything, oligopolistic rents have been reduced in Greek banking.
The privatisation of several banks controlled by the Greek State was another
important development in the second half of the past decade, which also contributed
to the enhancement of competition in the market. In the period 1995-2000, the market
share of the State-controlled banks fell by almost 20 percentage points, from 72.3% in
1995 to 52.9% in 2000.
3. Efficiency measurement
To evaluate the effects of the banking sector reforms, the frontier of the most
efficient practices should first be estimated (as a function of the relevant variables),
and then one can measure how far from this frontier the efficiency levels of different
institutions or groups of institutions are.
3 Efficiency can be measured in terms of
profits, costs or revenues. Studies in bank efficiency are usually based on costs.
Profits and revenues are more vulnerable than costs to extraordinary factors that can
affect disproportionately different institutions or categories of institutions. In addition,
financial sector reforms in Greece had a relatively moderate impact on bank
profitability, given that the pressures to achieve cost efficiency were to some
important extent offset by the lower margins resulting from fiercer competition, as
indicated in the next section. That is, the welfare gains from financial reforms to a
large extent accrued to users of bank services. For these reasons, the particular
approach used here is based on cost efficiency.
A firm is said to be cost efficient if it produces a given volume of output at the
least possible cost. Thus, cost efficiency is directly related to the firm’s cost
minimisation objective. Deviations from this minimum thus determine cost
inefficiencies. Hence, realised cost can be defined as a function of the output vector,
the price of inputs, the level of cost inefficiency and a set of random factors. In
logarithimic terms, realised cost, y, can be expressed as follows:
     y = f(x, w) + u + v  (1)
where x is the output vector, w the input prices vector, u the level of cost inefficiency
and v a random error term.
                                                          
3 Berger and Humphrey (1997) survey a large number of studies of bank efficiency based on this
approach.11
The problem of measuring cost inefficiency is to isolate it from the effect of
random factors on production costs. At least four cost frontier methods have been
used to measure inefficiencies in studies of the banking sector: the stochastic frontier
approach, the distribution free approach, the thick frontier approach, and the data
envelopment analysis.
4 As the efficient cost frontier is not  a priori known, the
objective of these approaches is to estimate it by using the data. However, each
approach is based on different assumptions and thus may lead to quite different
results.
The stochastic frontier approach assumes that deviations of realised cost from
the cost frontier are due either to cost inefficiency or to random fluctuations or both.
The inefficiencies are usually assumed to follow a truncated normal distribution,
whereas the random fluctuations are assumed to be normally distributed.
Although the stochastic frontier model gives inconsistent estimators when
cross-sectional data are used for the estimation of the cost frontier, many of its
assumptions can be relaxed when panel data are used.  According to Schmidt and
Sickles (1984), a data panel enables standard models of fixed and random effects to be
estimated without needing to make any assumption about the distribution of the
inefficiency term, provided that efficiency is constant over time. This method is thus
known as the 'distribution free' approach and it was first used by Berger (1993) in the
banking industry context.  In the case of a fixed effects model, a bank specific
constant is taken to be the bank's measure of inefficiency, while in the case of a
random effects model the average predicted residual for each bank in the panel is the
estimate of that bank's average inefficiency.
The thick frontier approach (Berger and Humphrey, 1991; Humphrey, 1993)
attempts to reduce the impact of outliers in estimating the cost frontier and identifies a
'thick frontier' consisting of those firms which are on the frontier plus those close to it.
The thick frontier method selects a larger subset of firms with only low costs -
                                                          
4 Most earlier studies of bank efficiency, and in particular those dealing with the efficiency implications
of bank mergers, are based on inter-temporal comparisons of simple financial ratios, such as operating
costs divided by total assets, or the return on equity or assets, see for example Rhoades (1986) and
Srinivasan (1992). However, there are several problems with these studies. As noted by Berger et al
(1993, p. 233) “first and foremost, financial ratios may be misleading indicators of efficiency because
they do not control for product mix or input prices”, as is the case with frontier methods. By comparing
cost-to- asset ratios inter-temporally, it is “implicitly assumed that all assets are equally costly to
produce (and all locations have equal costs of doing business). In addition, the use of a simple ratio
cannot distinguish between X-efficiency gains and scale and scope efficiency gains”. For a more recent
survey of studies on financial institutions’ efficiency, see Berger and Humphrey (1997).12
typically the quartile of firms with the lowest average cost - and estimates the 'thick'
cost frontier from a standard regression using only these observations. Similarly the
high cost frontier is determined from the quartile of firms with the highest average
costs. Inefficiency is measured as the range between these two frontiers.
Finally, the data envelopment analysis has also been used extensively in
banking studies. As against the three previous methods, this is a non-parametric
approach that maximises a function of weighted inputs and outputs subject to given
restrictions. It has the advantage that the efficient frontier is estimated solely on the
basis of the data, without requiring the specification of a particular form for the cost
function or the imposition of any distributional assumptions about the error term
and/or the inefficiency term, which may not be met in practice. Being deterministic,
this model does not allow for error. All deviations from the frontier are considered as
inefficiencies. This often results in their overestimation (Lozano-Vivas, 1998), as the
method is very sensitive to extreme observations (outliers), to measurement errors and
to the number of constraints specified.
There is no consensus in the literature as to which method should, in general,
be preferred. The choice usually depends on the available data. However, parametric
models are considered to be relatively more robust and for this reason such a model
will be used in this study. In particular, the fixed effects model proposed by Schmidt
and Sickles (1984) is used as it requires fewer assumptions and it is thus more
appropriate for a relatively small panel. This model was recently applied by Maudos
et al (2002) to measure the efficiency of European banks.
The general form of the model to be estimated is the following:
i it it it u v X a y + + + = b ' (2)
where i=1,…,N indexes the banks and  t=1,…,T indexes the time periods. In the case
of a translog cost function y it will be the log of cost, X'it a vector of the relevant
independent variables (in logs) and vit the random errors. The vit are uncorrelated with
the regressors Xit. The ui represent technical inefficiency and thus ui = 0 for all i. In
addition, ui are assumed to be iid with mean µ and variance su
2 and independent of the
vit. A particular distribution may or may not be assumed for the ui. If we let E(ui) = µ
> 0 and define a* = a +µ and ui* = ui - µ, so that the ui* are iid with mean 0, the
model can be rewritten in the following way:13
* ' * i it it it u v X a y + + + = b (3)
Both the error terms vit and ui
* now have zero means, and all results of the
panel data literature apply directly, with the exception of those that require normality.
Letting  ai = a +ui
 = a
* +ui
*  the model becomes
it it i it v X a y + + = b ' (4)
Treating ui as fixed, a separate intercept for every bank can be estimated, as
above. A frontier can be estimated using the fact that ui = 0 for all i. If the N estimated
intercepts are a1,…ai…, aN, the frontier can be simply defined as a = min (ai) and the
estimated inefficiency of each bank as û i = a i  - a. The estimates  a and  ûi  are
asymptotically consistent (see Schmidt and Sickles (1984)). Since in the linear form
of the cost function the variables are the logs of the initial variables, taking the
exponents of the (-ûi)s gives each bank’s (estimated) efficiency, Ei, as a ratio of the
minimum cost to produce the output vector, Y
min ,  to each bank’s realised cost, Yi
(i.e. Ei = (Y
min/Yi) = exp(-ûi )).
4. Model specification and data
4.1 The model
In estimating a cost function it is important to distinguish between a firm’s
inputs and outputs. In the case of banks, this is not an easy job, given their important
role in intermediating between lenders and borrowers (i.e. between financial savings
and investments) and in providing financial services to their customers. Thus, in
estimating a bank’s cost function, two approaches have been proposed: the
“production approach”, and the “intermediation approach”.
According to the “production approach”, banks use capital and labour as
inputs to produce individual accounts of various sizes and incur operating costs in the
process. (Benston (1972), Benston et al (1983), Mester (1987), Hunter et al (1990)).
Operating costs are incurred in the course of processing deposits and loan
documentation and debiting and crediting deposit and loan accounts. Therefore, the
number of deposits and loan accounts is, according to this approach, a measure of a
bank’s output, while average account size is used as a proxy for the characteristics of14
this output. Consequently, total bank costs in this approach include only operating
costs and exclude interest costs.
On the other hand, the “intermediation approach” asserts that banks collect
deposits and purchase funds from other financial institutions, and use them as inputs
to grant loans and to purchase other financial assets and securities, such as bonds and
shares (Benston et al (1982)). Accordingly, the amounts of loans and securities are
used as a measure of a bank’s output and interest costs on deposits and purchased
funds are included, along with operating costs, in the measurement of total costs. As
the “intermediation approach” is more inclusive of the total costs of banking, it is
preferred if the objective is to evaluate the economic viability of banks, given that
interest costs and operational costs are functionally the same from bank managers’
point of view. But there are drawbacks, too. Using this approach it is not possible to
analyse the implications of the fact that a large number of small accounts are much
more costly to service than a small number of large accounts as is the case with the
“production approach”, since outputs in the intermediation approach are computed as
outstanding amounts in all these accounts. Accordingly, the “production approach” is
preferred when more emphasis is placed on investigating banks’ operational
efficiency and productivity.
This study uses the “intermediation approach” to estimate the bank’s cost
function, because it investigates banks’ economic or competitive viability. This is a
more general concept than operational efficiency and hence is more appropriate when
the purpose is to evaluate the implications of the deregulation of the banking system
and the liberalisation of financial transactions in an economic environment
characterised by the gradual integration of the European financial systems and
markets. It is also more useful for analyzing the efficiency of bank mergers.
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where:
TC = total cost (financial and interest expenses)
Y1   = loans ( outstanding amount)
Y2   = other income (fees)
Y3   = securities15
P1 = price of loanable funds  calculated as the ratio of interest expenses to the total
value of deposits and repos
P2 = price of labour input, calculated as the ratio of personnel costs to the total
number of employees
P3 = price of physical capital, calculated as the ratio of depreciation to fixed assets.
i indexes the banks. The time subscript is omitted from the variables for simplicity of
presentation.
All the above variables are expressed in logs.
t = an indicator variable with values 1,…,7 for each year of the estimation period.
This variable is assumed to be closely related to technical progress and thus it is
included in the equation to control for the effects of technical progress on bank costs.
5
In the above model the symmetry restriction (ßij = ßji and ?ij = ?ji) is implied








The above specification of the cost function allows investigation of another
aspect of the cost structure of banks, that is the potential to realise scale economies.
Economies of scale exist if the average cost of producing a given (constant) product
mix is declining as bank size expands. In this case, a proportional increase in all input
levels would lead to a greater than proportionate increase in output. Evidence of
economies of scale would mean large banks have a cost advantage over small banks.
Scale economies are empirically measured by the ray scale elasticity:
      SCALE = ￿j ¶TC/¶Yj
SCALE measures the relative cost increase caused by a proportional increase in
outputs. Values of SCALE of less than one indicate economies of scale, that is cost
increases that are less than proportionate to output increases. A given output vector
can then be produced at a lower cost within one big bank compared to several smaller
banks with the same composition of outputs. Similarly, values of SCALE equal to or
                                                          
5 Because of sample size limitations, the time trend indicator t is not specified to interact with the
outputs Yi and input prices Pj variables. Accordingly, only the impact of the neutral technical change on
the cost function is considered in the paper, whereas the relevant impact, if any, of the non-neutral
technical change is not identified.16
greater than one indicate no economies or diseconomies of scale, respectively.
Furthermore, if SCALE is different from one then the firm is not competitively viable
(see Berger et al (1987)). A firm is competitively viable when its cost does not exceed
the scale-adjusted cost of producing the same product mix by any other set of firms.
Hence, if a firm is not competitively viable either a larger or a smaller firm, i.e. a
lower-cost competitor, could drive it from a competitive market in the long run if it
does not make necessary adjustments to its size.
4.2 The data
The above model is used to examine cost efficiency in Greek banking during
the period 1993-1999 by analysing annual data from a sample of 20 banks. The
sample includes all Greek commercial banks plus two mortgage banks which were
merged with a commercial bank during the period of analysis. Not included in the
sample are the institutions which did not publish profit and loss statements i.e.
branches of foreign banks and certain specialized credit institutions. Co-operative
banks have also been excluded because of their very small size. In 1999, banks
included in the sample accounted for 67% of total banking assets and 80% of total
employment. The final empirical results were based on 18 institutions because two
institutions had to be dropped: one institution went through a major restructuring
program during the period of investigation and it was eventually re-established as a
new bank, whereas the other institution was publishing until 1995 profit and loss
statements for the twelve-month period ending in June instead of December like all
other banks. A more detailed description of the sample is given in the following
paragraphs.
Total cost (operating expenses and interest paid) as a percent of total assets
declined significantly over the sample period from 11.8% in 1993 to 8.5% in 1999
(see Figure 1 and Table 1). More specifically, a marked reduction in the cost/asset
ratio took place in 1995, because the absolute amount of cost fell in 1995, following a
reduction in official rates and, as a result, in the total amount of ‘interest paid’. The
cost ratio remained more or less stable during the period 1995-1998 but fell again in
1999, this time as a result of the considerable increase in bank assets, to some extent
                                                                                                                                                                     
6 This restriction is required for the translog cost function to satisfy duality theory. It implies that if all
input prices were multiplied by a factor k, then total cost will also be multiplied by this factor k. See for
example Nadiri (1982).17
attributed to the doubling of share prices on the Athens Stock Exchange. Cost ratios
differed significantly among banks at the beginning of the sample period but these
differences gradually narrowed. This convergence in bank cost ratios was due to the
more pronounced improvement in the cost ratios of the least efficient institutions as
well as mergers that took place during the period, which typically involved banks with
very different cost ratios. It should be pointed out that because of these mergers the
sample contained 20 institutions in 1993 but only 15 in 1999, while their number was
further reduced to 10 in the coming years. As a matter of fact it is because of this
merger activity that the period of analysis was not extended with the more recent data
for the years 2000-2002.
The profitability ratio also improved during the period of analysis as ROA
increased from 0.84% in 1993 to 2.84% in 1999 (see Figure 1), but it should be borne
in mind that 1999 was a year of exceptional profits for banks because of the doubling
of share prices which allowed banks to realise profits on shares held and also
increased the level of turnover on the stock market. Since a lot of this business went to
banks, huge commissions were made for banks from dealing in shares on behalf of
their customers. In general,  differences  among  banks  are  quite  pronounced  though
the sample contains certain outliers in the sense that some banks have recorded losses
or exceptional profits. Excluding these outliers, the data indicate significant and
persistent divergences in bank profitability during the period of analysis, with the
ROA exhibiting greater dispersion than cost ratios not only through time but also
across banks (see Table1).
As far as the output of banks in the sample is concerned, in 1999 about a third
of their assets constituted loans granted to domestic residents. The loan to assets ratio
increased from 25.9% in 1993 to 36.3% in 1999, while significant differences existed
among individual institutions. As with the cost ratio, differences among banks
gradually diminished mainly as a result of mergers. Other earning assets of banks
include securities and in particular Greek government paper. The relative amount of
securities held by the sampling banks declined from 31.9% (with a minimum value of
3.2% and a maximum of 42.4%) of total assets in 1994 to 24.4% in 1999, despite the
fact that the large increase of share prices has boosted the value of securities.
Other variables included in the cost function are the unit cost of loanable
funds, the unit cost of labour and the unit cost of physical capital. The cost of loanable
funds is calculated by dividing total interest paid by total deposits and repos and is18
obviously closely linked to developments in interest rates. Indeed,  the main
characteristic of the period of analysis is the drastic reduction in bank interest rates,
with the key savings deposit rate declining from 17.5% in 1993 to 8.0% in 1999,
while the rate on deposits with an agreed maturity up to 12 months fell in the same
period from 19.4% to 8.7%. As a result of these cuts, the cost of loanable funds for the
sampling banks declined from 12.3% in 1993 to 6.9% in 1999. Differences among
banks were again more pronounced in 1993 than in 1999 (see Table 1).
The price of labour (personnel expenses over the number of employees)
increased from 5.7 million drachmas in 1993 to 11.1 million in 1999, which implies
an average annual increase of 5,4% in real terms. If we exclude certain outliers
connected with a small bank, differences in the price of labour among banks in the
sample look persistent and there is no indication that they diminished with the passage
of time. In general, the maximum value of the unit price of labour exceeds the
corresponding minimum value by a factor of 1.9.
Finally, the price of physical capital, which is calculated by dividing
depreciation expenses by the amount of fixed assets, exhibits the largest variability
among banks in the sample. This is hardly surprising since the sample includes on the
one hand the big and long established banks and on the other a set of new and fast
expanding institutions. In 1993, the price of capital was ranged from 4.3% to 20.3%
with an average value of 8.9%, whereas at the end of the sampling period the range
was 16.0% to 53.1% with an average value of 23.4%.
5. Results
5.1. Efficiency estimates
Equation (5) is fitted to an unbalanced and a balanced sample of the 18 banks.
In the unbalanced sample the observations of a bank stop when it is involved in a
merger (for example, the observations for the National Bank of Greece stop at 1997,
since in 1998 it merged with the National Mortgage Bank
7). The balanced sample is
obtained by imputing values for the merged banks after the merging. The imputation
(for a particular variable) is based on the share of the merged banks to the total value
of both banks the year before the merger occurred.19
Initially a model with bank specific constants is fitted. In this model the bank
with the smallest constant comprises an estimate of the cost frontier of the banks in
the sample. The exponent of the difference of a bank specific constant from the
frontier is an estimate of that bank's relative efficiency, i.e. exp(-ûi = a i – a). The
estimated relative efficiencies range from 20% to 83% for the unbalanced sample and
from 14% to 80% for the balanced sample, with average efficiency 48% and 56%,
respectively. The latter indicate that banks could save on average around 50% of their
realised costs if X-inefficiencies were eliminated. This is a rather large value, and it
may be biased as a result of estimation errors. The estimation may be hampered by the
small sample (i.e. the random errors may not have all cancelled out as expected in
larger samples, leading to an inflation of the estimated inefficiencies). To combat this
problem Maudos  et al (2002) truncate the extreme values from the estimated
inefficiencies. In this study, the truncation of the two extreme banks closest to or at
the cost frontier is proposed, since these two banks had a very narrow scope of
activities and one of them was also affiliated with a foreign bank for part of the
estimation period. The substitution of their estimates with the estimate of the third
most efficient bank gives average efficiencies of 69% and 67% for the two samples.
Furthermore, substituting the least efficient bank with the second least efficient one
left average efficiencies almost unaffected (70% and 68%), indicating that these
estimates are relatively robust.
8 The estimated efficiencies (computed after the
substitution of the values of the two most efficient banks) are plotted in descending
order (for the unbalanced sample) in Figure 2. As the figure suggests the majority of
banks lie around the average.
The above estimates of average cost efficiency for Greek banks do not seem to
be significantly different from the corresponding estimates for European banks.
Vennet (2002) investigates cost efficiency for a sample comprising banks from 17
European countries
9 for the period 1995-96 and found that the overall average cost
                                                                                                                                                                     
7Eurobank, which acquired three smaller private banks throughout 1993-99, is included as merged
because the mergers were relatively small and they did not result in severe breaks in the variables
considered.
8 This measure of efficiency assumes that the cost frontier and relative efficiencies remain constant
over time. Yet both absolute and relative cost efficiencies inevitably change, in part because the
financial reforms may have affected the efficiency of the banking sector and thus shifted the cost
frontier. Evaluating the cost frontier and the relative X-inefficiencies in various sub-periods could
provide some indication on these shifts. However, the lack of sufficient degrees of freedom prevents us
from addressing this issue.
9 The sample investigated by Vennet (2002) includes 2,375 banks from all EU-member countries plus
Norway and Switzerland.20
efficiency for the entire sample is 70 per cent for the traditional bank intermediation
activities, i.e. extending loans and holding securities.
10 Furthermore, Maudos et al
(2002), using a fixed effects model similar to ours for a sample of banks from 10 EU-
member countries,
11 has estimated an average efficiency which is higher than that for
Greek banks (Greece: 70%, EU-10: 76.9% or 86.6%
12), though their difference is not
statistically significant.
13 Considering the estimates for individual 10 EU countries at
5% truncation, one can conclude that Greek banks seem to be more efficient than
those in Finland and Luxembourg , to be as efficient as banks in the UK, France, Italy
and Portugal. By contrast, they are less efficient than the banks in the remaining
countries in the sample, in particular German and Austrian banks which emerge as the
most efficient in this study. At 10% truncation though, only banks in Finland and
Luxembourg have average efficiency levels similar to the Greek banks.
As stated above, the coefficient on t may be regarded as an indicator of the
impact of technical change on cost efficiency (see Lozano-Vivas (1998)). The
estimated coefficient is not statistically significant for either sample. Similarly, fitting
a model with a common constant and time does not give a significant time coefficient
either.
14 This is a surprising result, given the important investment that Greek banks
had made throughout the sample period in modernising their production process and
distribution channels, in particular in the area of information technology. It could be
argued that it takes some time for such investments to affect productivity. To test the
robustness of this result, a model with a common constant and time dummies for the
seven years of the sample (6 dummies were used) fitted as an alternative. This model
gave statistically significant (at 5% or 10% level) negative coefficients for all years
after 1994 in the case of the balanced sample, and for 1995, 1996, and 1997 in the
case of the unbalanced sample (see Tables A and B in the Appendix). It is also of
interest to note that all coefficients are negative for the 1995-1999. These findings
                                                          
10 The estimated average efficiency is higher (80 per cent) if the output includes non-traditional
activities, such as stock trading and insurance. This suggests that the traditional model may
underestimate efficiency (Vennet, 2002).
11 Maudos et al (2002) have investigated the efficiency of 832 banks of relatively large size (all banks
in the sample have more than $1000 in assets) over the period 1993-96. Their sample contains banks
from 10 EU- member countries, namely Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, and the UK.
12 With 5% and 10% truncation of the extreme values respectively.
13  The standard error of  the estimated average EU-10 cost efficiency is reported to be 9.3% (see
Maudos et al (2002)), implying that the estimated average cost efficiency for Greek banks is well
within the area defined by subtracting from and adding two  standard errors to the EU-10 average.21
suggest that although technical changes were not found to be associated with a
continuous improvement in cost performance throughout the sample period, they
seem to be quite important in the period 1995-1999 and indeed to have had marked
effects in particular years within this period.
5.2 Explaining inefficiencies
Figure 2, where the particular labels indicate the size (large/small depending
whether their assets are above or below three billion euros) and the type of ownership
(pubic/private) of individual banks, suggests that these two characteristics are
important in explaining bank cost efficiencies: the small private banks seem to be the
most efficient ones (average efficiency including the three banks on the frontier 81%
or 82% for the balanced and unbalanced samples respectively), while the large public
banks are shown to be the least efficient (average 43% and 35%, respectively).
Furthermore, the small public banks are on average (average efficiency 75% for both
samples) less efficient than the small private ones but more efficient than the private
large banks (average efficiency 63% or 52%).
In the literature, factors other than size and type of ownership have been found
to affect a bank's efficiency. Such factors are the type/ specialisation of the bank, the
number of branches and attitudes to risk. With the exemption of one institution, the
sample used here includes only commercial banks which to a considerable extent
offer a similar variety of products. Thus, only the number of branches or attitudes to
risk might be important here. Attitudes to risk can be proxied by equity and the ratio
of loans to assets. Maudos et al (2002) argue that large equity implies risk aversion,
since a risk-averse bank will tend to have more financial capital than the optimum (the
minimiser of costs or the maximiser of profits). On the other hand, a high loan to
assets ratio implies a willingness to take on risks.
15
To investigate whether the above mentioned factors are important in
explaining Greek bank inefficiencies, their correlations with the estimated
inefficiencies were computed, but, in addition, these variables were included in the
cost function to test their significance.
                                                                                                                                                                     
14 It is noted that Karafolas and Mantakas (1996) also fail to detect any impact of technical change on
the cost function.
15 See also Mester (1996).22
The correlations are presented in Table 2. As the results indicate, the
inefficiencies show a strong positive correlation with size of assets and also with own
funds. It seems therefore that, in the Greek banking sector, the larger a bank is and the
higher its own funds are the more inefficient it is. The positive correlation of own
funds with inefficiencies can easily be explained if own funds are regarded as a proxy
for size. But it is also consistent with the argument that large equity implies risk
aversion and consequently higher inefficiency.
In line with the above, the estimated inefficiencies are negatively correlated
with the loan to assets ratio, a measure of the willingness to take on risk, implying that
risk-taking banks are more efficient. It may be argued though that this finding simply
reflects the fact that most of the small banks are also relatively newly established and
thus have a higher loan to assets ratio as they were less affected by past credit
restrictions.
A strong positive correlation between inefficiencies and the number of
branches is also evident. This suggests that the higher overhead costs imposed by a
large number of branches dominates any cost savings derived by the broader and
cheaper deposit base. This result may also reflect that banks are under  strong
pressures to open branch offices in order to reduce customers’ transaction costs and
thus  gain a competitive edge , eventhough this strategy may not be efficient in the
short run. In any case, this finding indicates that Greek banks can improve their
performance  if they seek to optimize the size of their branch network, by reducing,
for example, branchs in overlapping markets.
The results from fitting the cost function with the above factors as additional
explanatory variables are presented in the Appendix in Tables A and B. A group
effects model testing for differences among the four groups
16 -private-large, private-
small, public-large and public-small  -does not give statistically significant differences
between the groups (for either the unbalanced or the balanced sample, see model 2 in
Tables A and B in the Appendix). Rerunning the model with group effects for the size
characteristic (large/small) only does not give statistically significant differences
between the two (see models 5 and 6), though a model with a common constant and
the size of assets as an additional explanatory variable gives a positive and statistically
significant coefficient for assets (see model 7). This indicates that the larger a bank is
                                                          
16 That is a model with dummies for the above bank characteristics instead of the bank specific ones.23
the more inefficient it is.
17 A model with group effects for private / public banks
shows that private banks are on average 9% or 7% more efficient than the public
banks (see model 3). Furthermore, a model with these two groups (private/public) and
their time interactions shows a negative effect for private banks (see model 4),
indicating that the private banks were benefiting from reductions in costs of the order
of 3% to 4% per annum as a consequence of technical change.
Finally, the inclusion of the number of branches
18 or of the own funds into the
cost function gave positive but statistically insignificant impacts (see Table A and B,
models 8 and 9, respectively). Thus, though they seem to have an impact on costs, the
inclusion of these variables in the cost function does not alter significantly the
estimated inefficiencies. Accordingly, both these results are taken to be supportive of
the conclusions drawn on the basis of the simple correlations of these variables with
the estimated cost inefficiencies.
5.3 Scale economies
Table 2 reports the estimated values of scale economies using both the
unbalanced and the balanced samples. The values in this Table indicate the percentage
increase in costs if all outputs were increased by 1%. All reported values are below
unity and hence indicate that Greek banks experienced scale economies in the period
1993-99. According to the unbalanced sample estimates, these economies averaged
12%. Scale economies fell during the sample period from 20% in 1993 to only 8% in
1999. As noted above, until the early 1990s the conduct of banking business was
governed by strict regulations, which acted as important constraints on the growth of
banks’ balance sheets. The gradual removal of these regulations strengthened banks’
assets and liabilities management and have accordingly led to more efficient bank
sizes. As expected, economies of scale are shown to be more important for the 12
smaller banks (14%) than for the 6 larger banks (10%). In both cases, however, the
estimated values indicate that further consolidation could lead to more efficient
institutions and improve their competitive viability. Balanced sample estimates lead in
                                                          
17 A similar finding is reported by Allen and Rai (1996).
18 A model that included the number of branches and the interaction of this variable with the variable
for technological change yielded positive but again statistically insignificant coefficients.24




This study investigated cost efficiency of Greek banks between 1993-1999, a
period characterised by major changes in the banking sector brought about by gradual
financial deregulation. The 'distribution free' approach was used, whereby a fixed
effects model was fitted to a panel of 18 banks. Despite the fact that the number of
banks is not large and the consistency of the estimators may be questioned, the results
obtained can be considered indicative of conditions in the Greek banking system.
Greek banks were found to exhibit substantial cost inefficiencies, indicating that there
is significant room for improving their competitiveness and profitability.  However, it
should be noted that the estimated X-inefficiencies are not, on average, different from
these found in studies for other European banks.
Additionally, the study explored the potential relationships between various
bank characteristics and cost inefficiency and found that bank size, type of ownership
(private /public) and attitude to risk seem to be related to bank inefficiencies. In
particular, large, public and risk averse banks tend to be more inefficient.
During the sample period, banks made significant investments in technology,
in particular in information systems. Such technical change seems to have had a
beneficial effect on costs, but only after 1995. This is expected since, in general, such
investments need time to pay off.  Private banks were found to benefit more from
technical change, managing to reduce cost inefficiency throughout the sample period.
However, a caveat should be added here, the time indicator used may not be an
adequate proxy of technical change, capturing simply the effect of other variables not
included in the model.
Scale economies were also examined. The Greek banking sector is
characterised by important scale economies, although they have declined throughout
the estimation period. It seems, therefore, that further consolidation may prove
beneficial for Greek banks (taking also into account the European orientation they
exhibit).
                                                          
19 The inconsistency in the results for the groups of small and large banks perhaps reflects the distortion
of the means of the relevant variables because of the imputation.25
Using costs in evaluating efficiency may not be sufficient to make inferences
about banks’ overall performance, as it does not take into account the revenue side.
Output quality as well as market power may have a significant effect on revenues and
profits and, indeed, profit efficiency will be the subject of further research. It can be
argued, however, that efficiency as it is inferred from costs, provides a lower
boundary estimate for the competitive viability of various banks, in particular in the
more intensely competitive environment in which Greek banks operate.26
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Banks in the Sample
    1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Average 11.8 11.9 10.3 10.1 9.6 9.6 8.5




Minimum 8.3 6.5 7.1 6.2 6.3 4.6 4.2
Average 0.84 1.12 1.14 0.81 0.99 1.18 2.84




Minimum 0.38 0.24 0.20 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.61
Average 25.9 25.4 29.2 29.8 32.7 37.8 36.3
Maximum 42.3 43.6 53.9 59.7 67.6 63.7 48.6
Loans/assets
ratio (%)
Minimum 10.6 11.5 11.7 12.3 13.6 21.2 14.2
Average 31.9 26.5 22.2 24.8 28.1 23.4 24.4
Maximum 53.4 39.6 35.4 45.4 42.2 33.8 37.7
Securities/assets
ratio (%)
Minimum 2.0 1.8 1.5 2.5 2.6 2.8 7.5
Average 12.3 13.6 10.9 10.8 9.0 8.0 6.9




Minimum 4.6 5.7 6.8 7.3 6.0 3.8 3.9
Average 5.7 6.5 7.3 8.6 9.4 9.9 11.1




Minimum 4.3 5.1 5.9 5.9 6.5 6.1 7.0
Average 8.9 12.2 15.4 15.9 17.9 21.2 23.4




Minimum 4.3 5.0 7.0 7.1 9.7 11.3 16.0
1 Operating expenses and interest paid as a percentage of total assets.
2 Return on assets, ROA.
3 Total interest paid as a percentage of deposits plus repos.
4 Personnel expenses over the number of employees.
5 Depreciation expenses as a percentage of fixed capital.
Source: Bank of Greece29
Table 2: Correlations between inefficiency terms and bank characteristics
Unbalanced sample Balanced sample
Assets 0.87 0.93
Own funds 0.76 0.87
Loan/asset ratio -0.55 -0.45
No of  branches 0.78 0.91
Table 3: Estimated scale economies
Unbalanced sample Balanced sample
All 18 banks 0.88 0.78
All 18 banks in 1993 0.80 0.75
Al 18 banks in 1999 0.92 0.80
6 large banks 0.90 0.70
12 small banks 0.86 0.8230
Figure 1. Total cost and profit (as a percentage of total assets)



















Cost ratio (left axis)





































































































TABLE A: Model coefficients and probability values, unbalanced data
Models 1 2 3 4 5
coeffs p-value coeffs p-value coeffs p-value coeffs p-value coeffs p-value
a 2.23 0.41 2.60 0.35 3.22 0.25 2.56 0.37
Y1 -0.70 0.13 0.36 0.53 0.78 0.15 0.76 0.16 0.91 0.11
Y2 1.20 0.02 0.46 0.48 0.30 0.65 0.16 0.81 0.31 0.65
Y3 0.15 0.67 -0.45 0.36 -0.63 0.21 -0.55 0.27 -0.68 0.19
P1 1.33 0.01 -0.18 0.78 -0.06 0.92 0.04 0.95 0.10 0.87
P2 0.51 0.52 1.46 0.14 0.89 0.37 0.72 0.47 0.57 0.56
P3 -0.84 0.09 -0.28 0.62 0.16 0.77 0.24 0.67 0.32 0.57
Y1
2 -0.06 0.28 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.07 0.26 0.10 0.08
Y2
2 0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.64 -0.01 0.83 0.00 0.95 -0.01 0.78
Y3
2 0.03 0.24 0.00 0.98 0.02 0.61 0.01 0.76 0.03 0.44
P1
2 0.12 0.18 0.01 0.95 0.03 0.80 0.01 0.94 0.04 0.77
P2
2 -0.20 0.20 -0.26 0.18 -0.34 0.07 -0.26 0.18 -0.32 0.11
P3
2 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.23 0.09 0.05 0.12 0.02 0.08 0.11
Y1*Y2 0.14 0.09 -0.02 0.80 -0.03 0.73 -0.01 0.93 -0.06 0.53
Y1*Y3 0.07 0.24 -0.09 0.17 -0.09 0.17 -0.06 0.40 -0.11 0.11
Y1*P1 -0.19 0.04 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.08 0.16 0.13 0.21 0.06
Y1*P2 0.11 0.38 -0.05 0.77 -0.04 0.80 -0.09 0.59 -0.04 0.79
Y1*P3 0.02 0.80 0.16 0.08 0.20 0.03 0.22 0.01 0.18 0.05
Y2*Y3 -0.18 0.02 0.08 0.41 0.06 0.55 0.03 0.78 0.07 0.48
Y2*P1 0.21 0.02 0.03 0.81 -0.03 0.76 -0.07 0.50 -0.06 0.57
Y2*P2 -0.24 0.18 -0.34 0.12 -0.25 0.24 -0.27 0.21 -0.23 0.29
Y2*P3 0.22 0.02 0.01 0.95 -0.03 0.83 -0.02 0.90 -0.08 0.51
Y3*P1 0.01 0.82 -0.13 0.10 -0.13 0.11 -0.09 0.28 -0.12 0.17
Y3*P2 0.02 0.81 0.22 0.15 0.21 0.17 0.23 0.13 0.22 0.16
Y3*P3 -0.12 0.04 -0.10 0.26 -0.12 0.16 -0.15 0.09 -0.07 0.40
P1*P2 -0.26 0.16 -0.01 0.97 -0.01 0.97 -0.04 0.87 -0.09 0.72
P1*P3 -0.23 0.03 -0.15 0.31 -0.15 0.33 -0.22 0.15 -0.09 0.53
P2*P3 -0.14 0.39 -0.32 0.14 -0.44 0.05 -0.55 0.02 -0.36 0.10







a1  (large-public) 5.25 0.06
a2  (large-public) 4.86 0.08
a3  (large-public) 4.74 0.09
a4  (large-public) 4.83 0.09
a5 (large-private) 4.56 0.10
a6 (large-private) 4.48 0.11
a7 (small-private) 4.06 0.15
a8 (small-private) 4.52 0.11
a9 (small-private) 4.42 0.11
a10 (small-private) 4.29 0.13
a11 (small-private) 4.44 0.11
a12 (small-private) 4.42 0.11
a13 (small-private) 3.81 0.17
a14 (small-private) 3.62 0.18
a15 (small-public) 4.23 0.13
a16 (small-public) 4.45 0.12
a17 (small-public) 4.51 0.11




PRIVATE -0.07 0.09 0.07 0.43








Models 6 7 8 9 10
coeffs p-value coeffs p-value coeffs p-value coeffs p-value coeffs p-value
a 1.27 0.73 2.34 0.36 2.90 0.34 2.65 0.35 0.91 0.75
Y1 1.00 0.10 0.68 0.16 0.96 0.09 0.90 0.11 0.76 0.18
Y2 0.36 0.60 0.78 0.22 0.24 0.73 0.36 0.61 0.03 0.96
Y3 -0.64 0.22 -0.94 0.04 -0.67 0.18 -0.71 0.16 -0.35 0.49
P1 -0.09 0.91 0.36 0.53 0.08 0.90 0.14 0.83 -0.97 0.18
P2 0.71 0.49 0.34 0.70 0.58 0.55 0.54 0.58 1.51 0.14
P3 0.37 0.52 0.29 0.56 0.34 0.54 0.32 0.57 0.46 0.42
Y1
2 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.16 0.07 0.23 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.07
Y2
2 -0.01 0.84 -0.01 0.58 -0.01 0.70 -0.01 0.70 0.00 0.89
Y3
2 0.03 0.42 0.03 0.43 0.01 0.83 0.03 0.46 0.06 0.15
P1
2 0.04 0.77 0.02 0.86 0.01 0.92 0.04 0.73 -0.03 0.80
P2
2 -0.31 0.13 -0.29 0.09 -0.24 0.23 -0.35 0.08 -0.53 0.01
P3
2 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.26 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.59
Y1*Y2 -0.06 0.57 -0.07 0.43 -0.03 0.73 -0.07 0.47 -0.05 0.61
Y1*Y3 -0.11 0.10 -0.08 0.22 -0.08 0.24 -0.11 0.10 -0.15 0.04
Y1*P1 0.21 0.06 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.19 0.09 0.18 0.09
Y1*P2 -0.05 0.78 0.03 0.84 -0.06 0.73 -0.02 0.92 0.04 0.79
Y1*P3 0.18 0.05 0.10 0.23 0.20 0.03 0.17 0.06 0.11 0.21
Y2*Y3 0.07 0.52 0.07 0.46 0.07 0.47 0.09 0.41 0.05 0.62
Y2*P1 -0.04 0.71 -0.01 0.89 -0.04 0.72 -0.05 0.62 -0.09 0.43
Y2*P2 -0.23 0.29 -0.24 0.22 -0.26 0.24 -0.23 0.29 -0.19 0.37
Y2*P3 -0.07 0.57 -0.04 0.74 -0.01 0.93 -0.09 0.48 -0.16 0.19
Y3*P1 -0.12 0.16 -0.10 0.18 -0.11 0.16 -0.11 0.19 -0.05 0.51
Y3*P2 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.22 0.15 0.21 0.18 0.19 0.23
Y3*P3 -0.09 0.34 -0.05 0.52 -0.14 0.12 -0.07 0.43 0.00 0.98
P1*P2 -0.08 0.73 -0.05 0.82 -0.06 0.80 -0.06 0.81 0.25 0.34
P1*P3 -0.10 0.49 0.03 0.83 -0.17 0.27 -0.10 0.52 -0.09 0.53
P2*P3 -0.40 0.08 -0.16 0.41 -0.50 0.03 -0.34 0.13 -0.17 0.45































LARGE * TIME 0.02 0.60
ASSETS 0.19 0.00
BRANCHES (BR) 0.03 0.83
(BR)*(BR) 0.01 0.56
OWN FUNDS 0.02 0.6433
TABLE B: Model coefficients and probability values, balanced data
Models 1 2 3 4 5
coeffs p-value coeffs p-value coeffs p-value coeffs p-value coeffs p-value
a 2.42 0.31 3.27 0.19 3.30 0.18 3.41 0.18
Y1 0.24 0.60 0.12 0.83 0.57 0.24 0.66 0.18 0.62 0.26
Y2 1.07 0.02 0.25 0.68 0.07 0.91 -0.02 0.97 0.08 0.90
Y3 -0.03 0.93 -0.37 0.43 -0.59 0.20 -0.52 0.26 -0.60 0.22
P1 1.75 0.00 -0.62 0.31 -0.39 0.52 -0.27 0.67 -0.28 0.66
P2 0.48 0.53 2.39 0.01 1.63 0.07 1.38 0.13 1.39 0.14
P3 -1.22 0.00 -0.77 0.13 -0.24 0.62 -0.12 0.81 -0.11 0.83
Y1
2 -0.02 0.70 0.05 0.28 0.05 0.30 0.03 0.50 0.06 0.27
Y2
2 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.98 0.01 0.72 0.00 0.98
Y3
2 0.00 0.97 0.01 0.84 0.02 0.55 0.02 0.59 0.04 0.36
P1
2 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.83 0.09 0.41 0.09 0.40 0.08 0.51
P2
2 -0.20 0.16 -0.36 0.05 -0.45 0.01 -0.41 0.02 -0.42 0.02
P3
2 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.27 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.16
Y1*Y2 0.04 0.56 0.07 0.40 0.04 0.64 0.05 0.51 0.03 0.74
Y1*Y3 0.01 0.77 -0.08 0.18 -0.08 0.19 -0.05 0.39 -0.09 0.15
Y1*P1 -0.07 0.34 0.13 0.18 0.18 0.06 0.18 0.06 0.18 0.07
Y1*P2 0.08 0.46 0.03 0.83 0.03 0.80 0.00 0.99 0.03 0.83
Y1*P3 0.09 0.15 0.11 0.19 0.15 0.07 0.17 0.04 0.11 0.20
Y2*Y3 -0.04 0.50 0.04 0.67 0.03 0.70 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.74
Y2*P1 0.04 0.58 0.09 0.32 0.05 0.62 0.01 0.93 0.02 0.82
Y2*P2 -0.25 0.14 -0.46 0.02 -0.31 0.12 -0.29 0.14 -0.32 0.12
Y2*P3 0.20 0.00 0.09 0.35 0.05 0.64 0.05 0.65 0.00 0.98
Y3*P1 0.00 0.93 -0.15 0.05 -0.15 0.04 -0.13 0.09 -0.12 0.12
Y3*P2 0.05 0.53 0.22 0.09 0.20 0.14 0.20 0.14 0.22 0.12
Y3*P3 -0.13 0.02 -0.09 0.20 -0.11 0.12 -0.13 0.07 -0.05 0.45
P1*P2 -0.25 0.14 0.06 0.77 0.09 0.67 0.07 0.73 0.00 0.99
P1*P3 -0.23 0.02 -0.17 0.18 -0.12 0.34 -0.18 0.18 -0.10 0.47
P2*P3 -0.27 0.05 -0.26 0.16 -0.33 0.08 -0.42 0.03 -0.27 0.16







a1  (large-public) 2.34 0.34
a2  (large-public) 1.72 0.50
a3  (large-public) 1.45 0.57
a4  (large-public) 1.41 0.58
a5 (large-private) 1.41 0.58
a6 (large-private) 1.17 0.65
a7 (small-private) 0.63 0.81
a8 (small-private) 1.05 0.69
a9 (small-private) 0.99 0.70
a10 (small-private) 0.80 0.76
a11 (small-private) 0.99 0.70
a12 (small-private) 0.96 0.71
a13 (small-private) 0.41 0.87
a14 (small-private) 0.41 0.87
a15 (small-public) 0.77 0.76
a16 (small-public) 1.07 0.68
a17 (small-public) 1.09 0.67




PRIVATE -0.09 0.03 0.04 0.67







TABLE B  (continued)
Models 6 7 8 9 10
coeffs p-value coeffs p-value coeffs p-value coeffs p-value coeffs p-value
a 2.45 0.48 2.65 0.27 2.63 0.33 3.44 0.18 1.04 0.69
Y1 0.70 0.24 0.52 0.27 0.95 0.06 0.65 0.20 0.76 0.13
Y2 0.09 0.89 0.34 0.56 0.24 0.70 0.09 0.88 -0.34 0.59
Y3 -0.56 0.26 -0.80 0.07 -0.76 0.10 -0.65 0.17 -0.34 0.47
P1 -0.42 0.56 -0.15 0.79 -0.06 0.92 -0.25 0.69 -1.35 0.06
P2 1.48 0.12 1.34 0.12 1.06 0.24 1.35 0.14 2.33 0.02
P3 -0.07 0.90 -0.19 0.68 0.00 1.00 -0.11 0.83 0.02 0.97
Y1
2 0.06 0.28 0.04 0.42 0.04 0.40 0.06 0.26 0.04 0.45
Y2
2 0.00 0.95 -0.01 0.65 -0.01 0.59 0.00 0.91 0.01 0.66
Y3
2 0.04 0.35 0.02 0.51 0.01 0.74 0.03 0.40 0.05 0.15
P1
2 0.08 0.49 0.06 0.57 0.11 0.33 0.08 0.46 0.01 0.90
P2
2 -0.42 0.02 -0.45 0.01 -0.37 0.04 -0.45 0.01 -0.65 0.00
P3
2 0.07 0.14 0.03 0.49 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.16 0.03 0.43
Y1*Y2 0.03 0.74 0.00 0.98 0.02 0.85 0.02 0.82 0.06 0.44
Y1*Y3 -0.09 0.14 -0.06 0.32 -0.08 0.17 -0.09 0.15 -0.10 0.11
Y1*P1 0.18 0.07 0.11 0.23 0.19 0.05 0.17 0.11 0.16 0.10
Y1*P2 0.02 0.87 0.08 0.53 0.05 0.72 0.04 0.80 0.02 0.89
Y1*P3 0.12 0.18 0.04 0.61 0.14 0.08 0.11 0.18 0.08 0.35
Y2*Y3 0.03 0.75 0.05 0.51 0.07 0.44 0.04 0.64 -0.01 0.86
Y2*P1 0.03 0.74 0.07 0.48 0.04 0.67 0.03 0.80 -0.01 0.92
Y2*P2 -0.31 0.14 -0.25 0.19 -0.34 0.10 -0.32 0.12 -0.25 0.21
Y2*P3 0.00 0.99 0.02 0.84 0.07 0.48 0.00 0.97 -0.04 0.69
Y3*P1 -0.12 0.11 -0.11 0.13 -0.16 0.03 -0.12 0.14 -0.06 0.46
Y3*P2 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.22 0.21 0.11 0.22 0.11 0.24 0.09
Y3*P3 -0.06 0.40 -0.02 0.74 -0.14 0.06 -0.06 0.41 -0.02 0.73
P1*P2 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.75 0.05 0.83 0.01 0.96 0.27 0.25
P1*P3 -0.11 0.43 -0.01 0.91 -0.08 0.54 -0.10 0.46 -0.13 0.31
P2*P3 -0.30 0.15 -0.07 0.70 -0.35 0.06 -0.26 0.18 -0.21 0.28































LARGE * TIME 0.01 0.68
ASSETS 0.19 0.00
BRANCHES (BR) -0.03 0.80
(BR)*(BR) 0.02 0.29
OWN FUNDS 0.01 0.7635
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